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A Strategy of Attrition through  
Enforcement: The Unmaking of Irregular 
Migration in Malaysia 
Low Choo Chin 
Abstract: This article reviews Malaysia’s attempt to achieve zero migra-
tion irregularity by focusing on workplace enforcement, and examines 
how Malaysia’s migration control has become a struggle between the 
state and employers. Applying the framework of “enforcement through 
attrition,” this research examines three newly introduced principles gov-
erning workplace enforcement: employer sanctions, the Strict Liability 
Principle, and the Employers’ Mandatory Commitment. The shift to 
employers in Malaysia’s attrition landscape aims to control illegal em-
ployment, thereby frustrating the friendly environment to affect migrants’ 
behaviour. The Malaysian experience suggests that increasing legal con-
sequences for employers hiring undocumented workers runs parallel 
with making them accountable for the welfare of their foreign workers, 
thus ensuring better protection of migrant rights. Drawing upon data 
from semi-structured interviews, government documents, regulations 
and online news media, this paper empirically analyses the new policy’s 
effects and implications. The findings suggest this deterrence model has 
a positive effect on the existing documented migrants, demonstrating an 
increase in both legal employment and in wages for the existing legal 
migrant workforce. 
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Introduction 
This paper1 demonstrates how Malaysia transformed migration control 
from being migrant-oriented to employer-oriented. Eliminating irregular 
migration in Malaysia is construed primarily as a struggle between the 
government and immigrants. The one-sided enforcement measures that 
criminalise migrants ignore the role of cross-national networks, employ-
ers, the public, recruitment agents, market actors and the government in 
sustaining irregular migration. A growing body of literature has shown 
the ineptitude of the existing deterrence system and the consequences 
that unenforced legal standards have on other stakeholders (Garcés-
Mascareñas 2012; Jones 2000; Kassim and Mat Zin 2011; Nah 2012). 
Like other receiving countries, Malaysia is witnessing a policy turn to-
ward “pragmatism.” Internal control is increasingly viewed as a pragmat-
ic approach, with enforcement focusing on non-migrant actors (Bloch 
and Chimienti 2011: 1275). The harbouring of irregular migration and 
the positive environment that breeds irregular migrants has called into 
question the efficacy of stringent border enforcement, deportation, and 
amnesty, which are ineffective in terms of preventing migrants from 
flooding the labour market. The literature on managing unauthorised 
migration has sought to move beyond conventional policy instruments 
to a more realistic strategy called “attrition through enforcement” (Ko-
bach 2008; Krikorian 2005; Vaughan 2006). 
Krikorian first coined the term “attrition through enforcement” in 
his 2005 seminal writing entitled “Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A 
Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement,” which was developed with-
in the U.S. political context. Attrition through enforcement works in two 
ways: firstly, by reducing the number of irregular immigrants through 
encouraging them to self-deport; and secondly, by deterring the entry of 
future immigrants through increased enforcement (Krikorian 2005: 1). 
Illegal employment of unauthorised aliens is an important enforcement 
area. Eliminating the demand for jobs, or the attraction of irregular mi-
gration, encourages irregular migrants to self-deport. Proponents of self-
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deportation have argued that border control, forced removal, and mass 
legalisation are unlikely to stem the flow of migrants. They have ques-
tioned whether increased resources and enforcement activities could alter 
the behaviour of individuals who violate the law. Rather than arrest and 
removal, irregular immigrants could be encouraged to leave the country 
on their own. Border security has no effect on reducing the size of the 
existing illegal alien population and does not address the problem of 
those who have overstayed; it only shrinks the number of new entries. 
Internal control, particularly workplace enforcement, addresses the size 
of the existing illegal population (Kobach 2008; Krikorian 2005; 
Vaughan 2006). 
An attrition strategy includes eliminating access to jobs, preventing 
irregulars from obtaining driver’s licenses, integrating enforcement oper-
ations between federal immigration authorities with state enforcement 
bodies, reducing visa overstays, increasing the number of removals and 
discouraging the settlement of illegal aliens. These actions require the 
combination of a verification system and conventional enforcement, 
such as raids, detentions, deportation, seizing the assets of detained ille-
gal aliens, and court convictions. Verifying the legal status of all foreign 
workers prevents irregular migrants from opening a bank account, apply-
ing for a loan or getting a business license, which makes it difficult for 
them to stay in the country without documentation (Bloch, Kumarappan, 
and Mckay 2015: 133; Vaughan 2006: 3). Michele Waslin, an opponent 
of self-deportation, argued that such measures have negative conse-
quences on national economies, local citizens and legal immigrants. 
Waslin has claimed that self-deportation makes life difficult not only for 
migrants but also for many residents and businesses; however, attrition 
through enforcement is projected as a better alternative to the strict 
enforcement of mass deportation (Waslin 2012: 8).  
Criminal deterrence theory proposes that imposing sanctions can 
influence behaviour. The punishment’s severity affects the probability of 
regulations being violated. Deterrence of illegal activity occurs when 
there is a perception that punishment will take place; the perception of 
“what has happened to others” may influence an individual’s behaviour. 
Mark Stafford and Mark Warr stated that “While the use of sanctions 
should discourage illegal activity, the absence of punishment may pro-
mote violations” (cited in Rocha et al. 2014: 80). Applying deterrence 
theory in the immigration context means that migrant decision making 
could be altered with the threat of enforcement. If migrants were made 
to believe that the enforcement threat is real, irregular migrants would 
leave on their own (Kobach 2008: 160). Zero violations could be 
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achieved with the “credible threat of enforcement” to change the law-
breakers’ behaviour (Kobach 2008: 156).  
This paper applies the idea of attrition through enforcement in ex-
amining how Malaysia transformed its enforcement landscape. Malaysia’s 
recent moves have illustrated a deterrence model based on the struggle 
between the state and the employers. Control measures have limited 
success due to the ineffective enforcement of laws dealing with the em-
ployment of undocumented migrants and the harbouring of irregulars. 
Operational policy narratives emphasise prosecuting the migrants, which 
many scholars have argued does not address the pull factor. Among the 
internal control measures, employer sanctions are one of the unenforced 
aspects of Malaysia’s Immigration Act of 1959/63 due to a lack of evi-
dence and trial delays, signalling that employers could easily escape pun-
ishment (Jones 2000; Kanapathy 2008; Kassim 1997; Nah 2012). Begin-
ning in 2016, Malaysia launched massive enforcement campaigns against 
errant employers through freezing employers’ assets, increasing maxi-
mum penalties, public shaming, and introducing corporal punishments 
(Achariam 2016a; Kong 2016a; Rodzi 2017). Apart from actively explor-
ing new deterrence measures, the Immigration Department is widening 
its legislative power and enforcement grounds. At the same time, the 
department shifted the responsibility for migrant surveillance and moni-
toring to employers by introducing two new principles – the Strict Liabil-
ity Principle and the Employers’ Mandatory Commitment – into Malay-
sia’s enforcement landscape.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I start by re-
viewing how employer sanctions were implemented to achieve the stated 
objective of “zero illegal migration.” I then analyse the implications of 
this policy shift, which suggest that attrition though enforcement has a 
positive effect on the industry’s legal employment, the protection of 
migrants’ welfare, and the local labour force, despite pressures from the 
industrial players and the countries of origin. Third, I look at how the 
government delegated the task of workplace surveillance to non-state 
actors. Finally, I develop four critiques on why the Malaysian govern-
ment’s new approaches might not succeed in the way the government 
anticipated.  
Methods 
This paper empirically analyses the rationale and effects of attrition 
through enforcement on various stakeholders in Malaysia, drawing upon 
the analysis of interviews, parliamentary debates, acts and regulations, 




official publications, press releases, and secondary literature. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with two agencies of the Ministry 
of Home Affairs – the Immigration Affairs Division and the Border 
Security and Police Division – about the prospects and limitations in 
Malaysia’s migration control policies. Five officers were interviewed 
from the Border Security and Police Division in March 2015, including 
the secretary, principal assistant secretaries, and assistant secretaries. This 
division referred the researcher to the Immigration Affairs Division. A 
formal interview was set up with the principal assistant secretary and the 
assistant secretary of the Immigration Affairs Division in August 2015. 
The interviews were conducted in Malay at the departments’ headquar-
ters in Putrajaya. Each interview was transcribed and analysed using 
thematic analysis. Official publications and press releases were analysed 
using document analysis. 
Literature Review 
The flow of irregular migrants in Malaysia is unprecedented. There are 
6.7 million foreign workers, and the ratio of Malaysian citizens to for-
eigners is 2.5:1 (Federation of Malaysia 2016a: 154). Out of the 6.7 mil-
lion foreigners, 2.1 million have a valid permit, and 4.6 million entered 
the country illegally (Federation of Malaysia 2014: 72). According to 
statistics from the Immigration Department, the irregular migrant ratio is 
3:1, meaning one out of every three foreign workers arrested during the 
enforcement operations is undocumented (Federation of Malaysia 2016d: 
58). Alarmed by the number of irregulars, the Immigration Department 
pledged to make Malaysia free of irregular immigrants, aiming to achieve 
“zero irregular migration” by 2020 (The Malaysian Insider 2014). 
The literature questioned conventional enforcement, such as border 
enforcement, mass amnesty, and deportation, as the policy instrument to 
regulate the flow of illegal labour without tackling the pull factor. Repat-
riation and border surveillance have been ineffective because they do not 
consider the strong pull factor of the labour market’s demand (Carling 
and Hernández-Carretero 2011; Castles 2004; Cornelius and Salehyan 
2007; LoBreglio 2012; Garcés-Mascareñas 2015). Border control and 
enforcement do not affect the employers’ demand for a flexible work-
force. Without addressing the labour-market pressures, enforcement may 
not be an effective barrier to reduce irregular migration (Cornelius and 
Salehyan 2007: 150). Kiera LoBreglio suggested the solution should be 
based on economy and should involve the elimination of immigration 
barriers to promote maximum economic efficiency. The abolition of 
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employer restrictions in hiring labour and in allowing liberal programmes 
for foreign workers would safeguard the interests of immigrants in the 
labour market. An economic approach is important, as the labour market 
is the main pull factor (LoBreglio 2012: 959). 
Favell and Hansen suggested that irregular migration can only be 
controlled through a “market-based rather than a state-enforced mecha-
nism” because “migrants will not stay where the market does not want 
them” (2002: 585). Enforcing immigration laws in the workplace, con-
ducting raids, and apprehending and convicting errant employers pro-
duces the expected deterrence result (Cornelius 2005: 785). Castles noted 
that migration control policies often fail because employer sanctions are 
not enforced when such legal measures are available (2004: 854). A 
strong deterrent that impacts future entry and re-entry is the prevention 
of illegal employment, which undermines the state’s legal migration 
channel. Shrinking the black-market economy reduces the pull factor and 
deters prospective migrants. Nevertheless, the practicalities of enforce-
ment and the conflicting domestic interests often hinder employer sanc-
tions (Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011: 50, 53).  
Among the many strategies for managing unauthorised migration in 
ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia and Thailand, workplace inspec-
tions and enforcement on errant employers are “not implemented with 
sufficient resolve” (Battistella 2002: 368). This raises the question of how 
much the Malaysian state and society benefit from those “underground” 
workers. Malaysia needs the undocumented workers, who are necessary 
for performing menial jobs in plantations, factories and the service in-
dustry. Due to the high demand for labourers, irregular migration is 
often tolerated. Gurowitz captured Malaysia’s perception on undocu-
mented migrants, stating: “Malaysia needs these workers, but does not 
want them” (2000: 863).  
The enforcement has been lax or sporadic, and Malaysia has 
demonstrated a “stop-go” attitude for many decades (Garcés-Mascareñas 
2012: 102). The government’s approach has been inconsistent, oscillating 
between deportation and migration bans, followed by legalisation, return 
migration and the lifting of bans. “Policy reversal” often takes place 
within a short period of time, indicating conflicting regulations (Devada-
son and Chan 2014: 19–20). Malaysian scholars inferred the policy rever-
sal as the “ad hoc” character of Malaysian migration policies caused by 
the pressures of employers’ demands (Garcés-Mascareñas 2012: 66). 
Garcés-Mascareñas suggested reconsidering irregular migration as a “way 
to create a cheap and flexible labour force” (2013: 32). Under Malaysia’s 
guest worker programme, foreign workers are required to undergo the 




whole process of recruitment with the associated recruitment costs to 
extend their contracts. As a result, they overstay, and regularisation is 
utilised as a policy instrument (Kaur 2014: 354). 
In the past, frequent amnesty programmes have hindered immigra-
tion enforcement against employers. Due to previous government am-
nesty programmes and other policy U-turns, employers believed illegal 
hiring was possible by simply paying fines (known as “compounds” in 
the Malaysian context). The enforcement regime was not functioning 
when the migrants knew they would be pardoned in the future with safe 
passage home and the employers knew they would be fined an amount 
that was lower than what is required under the Immigration Act. Nu-
merous amnesty programmes were conducted in 1989, 1991, 1996, 2004 
and 2011, but these did not reduce the number of irregulars. Amnesty 
programmes are considered attempts to re-regulate the labour system by 
going against the law, resulting in dysfunctional migration control (Gar-
cés-Mascareñas 2012: 84; Devadason and Chan 2014: 20).  
Evaluating the effectiveness of any migration policy (including em-
ployer sanctions) is impossible without discussing the corruption found 
within the various government agencies. Employers are not the only 
stakeholders reaping the benefits from hiring irregulars. Official corrup-
tion involving both street-level enforcement officers and the highest 
levels of the immigration department is more consequential than illegal 
employment and harbouring.2 Systematic corruption has contributed to 
the internal bordering practices of police raids and roadblocks at various 
locations in Malaysian cities. When the undocumented migrants confront 
police officers, they use bribes to navigate the “border”, enabling them 
to continue to stay illegally (Franck 2014: 10). Franck argued that this 
border control is set up to make money from migrants, and the practice 
raises “important questions around where and why the border is protect-
ed – and in whose interest” (Franck 2014: 11). The involvement of state 
officials in benefitting from the employment of foreigners without work 
permits illustrates that those violating laws are inside state structures (van 
Schendel 2005: 60). 
This paper extends the existing debates to examine how new 
measures of employer sanctions were introduced to close off access to 
the job market. This pragmatic approach was drastically different from 
the past. First, the struggle against irregular migration in Malaysia wit-
nessed not only the systematic enforcement of the Immigration Act but 
also the introduction of new punitive measures, which were rather ex-
                                                 
2  This idea is taken directly from a reviewer’s comment. 
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treme in nature: charging employers in court, caning them, publicly 
shaming them, freezing their assets and increasing the maximum penal-
ties. This extreme reform has taken place since 2016 under the new di-
rector-general of the Immigration Department, Mustafar Ali. In reform-
ing the department, Mustafar imposed stricter law enforcement on crim-
inal activities, such as harbouring irregulars and falsifying documents to 
act as deterrence. Mustafar, who was also the former deputy chief com-
missioner of the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), wid-
ened the enforcement grounds to target corrupt officers, as graft is the 
biggest issue every enforcement agency in Malaysia faces (Raj 2017). 
Second, employer sanctions were implemented in tandem with anti-
corruption drives. Corruption is the most controversial aspect challeng-
ing the efficacy of the state’s policy and, in the past, the state has failed 
to adequately address the central problem of corruption. Third, employ-
ers were forced to be more responsible and accountable for carrying out 
migrant surveillance. Prior to 2016, the state conducted migrant surveil-
lance; however, there were signs that the state was shifting the responsi-
bility of migrant surveillance to employers via the two newly introduced 
principles of the Strict Liability Principle and the Employers’ Mandatory 
Commitment.  
The Implementation of Employer Sanctions 
The legislation that deals with employer sanctions in Malaysia is the Im-
migration Act of 1959/63. Employing irregular migrants has been a 
criminal offence since the Immigration Act’s amendment in 2002. Under 
Section 55B, those guilty of employing or harbouring illegals are subject 
to a jail term not exceeding 12 months, a fine of between MYR 10,000 
and MYR 50,000 per employee, or both. The penalty is increased to 
whipping, of up to six strokes, and imprisonment, between six months 
and five years, if the employers hire more than five irregular immigrants 
(Federation of Malaysia 2006a). While severe, the provision goes unen-
forced. Two years after the whipping provision was introduced, no er-
rant employers had received such a punishment, despite 112 court cases 
involving employers harbouring irregular immigrants. Meanwhile, 18,607 
irregular migrants were caned for illegal entry in 2004. The Immigration 
Department believed the errant employers were “more than willing to 
pay up rather than toe the line and get legal (migrant) workers under 
their payroll” (Shah 2016b). 
A recent report from the parliamentary debates suggests that illegal 
employment is caused by the under-enforced provisions of the Immigra-




tion Act. Some parliamentarians severely criticised the fact that violations 
go unpunished, arguing that it undermines the deterrence effect. Under 
the Immigration Act, violations are severely punished with fines, impris-
onment, and whipping. However, errant employers were assured they 
would only be fined a registration fee of MYR 800 if they admitted hir-
ing foreign workers without a permit under the current legalisation offer 
called the “Rehiring Programme,” (despite the Immigration Act’s fines 
of MYR 10,000–50,000 for each undocumented foreign worker em-
ployed), thus violating the letter of the law. One parliamentary member 
lamented that “We are no longer rule of law [but] rule by man” (Ngeh 
Koo Ham, in Federation of Malaysia 2016b: 68). Under the Rehiring 
Programme, implemented on 15 February 2016, employers were re-
quired to pay MYR 800 (registration fee), MYR 400 (administrative fee), 
MYR 60 (fee for temporary work permit), MYR 125 (processing fee), 
MYR 500 (employer’s compound), and MYR 300 (employee’s com-
pound) to legalise each worker, totalling MYR 2,185. An additional MYR 
500 in fines would be charged should the authorities find the workers 
before their employers had surrendered and registered them. The MYR 
800 registration fee was a “fair trade-off” rate, taking into consideration 
the cost of detaining and deporting foreigners; however, employers ap-
pealed the high fines (Nik Anis 2016). 
Under Section 55 (1), the home minister has discretionary power to 
exempt any parties from the operation of all or any provision of the 
Immigration Act (Federation of Malaysia 2006a). The discretionary pow-
er granted is threatening the law’s enforcement: “If any parties are par-
doned after violating the law, what has happened to Malaysia’s law?” 
(Ngeh Koo Ham, in Federation of Malaysia 2016b: 69). Amnesty in-
volves a lower penalty, and this is what happened under the series of 
legalisation programmes, including the Rehiring Programme, in which 
the Immigration Department “cut a deal with the Attorney-General’s 
Chambers to relax the execution of the law” (Shah 2016a).  
Compounds or fines against errant employers have not functioned 
as an effective deterrent. The Immigration Department has pushed to 
prosecute errant employers. Instead of issuing compounds to those em-
ployers, the Department wanted them dragged to court to face the brunt 
of Section 55 of the Immigration Act. Compounds were “taken as a 
mere slap on the wrist, and not as a deterrent factor” (Mohd 2015). Be-
tween January and February 2015, 325 employers were arrested, a figure 
that seemed small in comparison to the actual number of employers 
hiring undocumented migrant workers. The issue generated considerable 
criticism over the weak deterrence effect of fines; the employers were 
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willing to pay the fines and simply continued committing the offence. 
Charging employers in court was thought to improve the deterrence 
effect of the penalty regime (Mohd 2015). 
In March 2016, Malaysia pushed for whipping as a deterrent for 
employers found guilty of harbouring and employing undocumented 
migrants and encouraged the courts to impose caning sentences for 
Immigration Act violations. Operation enforcement was widened to 
hunt errant employers who harboured illegal workers, and convicted 
employers risked action under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-
Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007 (Shah 2016b). However, it 
is questionable whether whipping can be effectively implemented on 
employers. In 2012, the government suggested doing away with the 
whipping of irregular migrants, as it is considered an inhumane punish-
ment. According to the then Minister in the Prime Minister’s Depart-
ment Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz, whipping was not an effective deter-
rent as it did not lessen the problem of irregulars and created a negative 
perception of Malaysia as some of the irregular migrants were victims of 
human trafficking(Free Malaysia Today 2012). Punitive whipping is now 
considered a human rights violation and is no longer carried out in Ma-
laysia on irregular migrants. 
Freezing the assets and bank accounts of employers who hire ir-
regulars is another new ruling introduced in Malaysia. In September 2016, 
the Immigration Department’s Director-General, Mustafar Ali, an-
nounced that the nation-wide policy would begin in October 2016. Em-
ployers were given a month to legalise their workers, after which time 
they were subject to Section 56 (1) of the Immigration Act, which had 
never previously been enforced. The policy to freeze the assets of busi-
nesses received a mostly negative reaction from industry representatives. 
Freezing a company’s assets would affect its business and potentially 
result in more employees, including Malaysians and legal foreign workers, 
being laid off. Employers, represented by the Malaysian Employers Fed-
eration (MEF), contested the decision, claiming there was no legal basis 
for the Immigration Department to freeze their assets as the Immigra-
tion Act does not have a provision for doing so (The Star Online 2016). A 
court order would be required if the Immigration Department wanted to 
freeze an employer’s assets. According to the critics, the Immigration 
Act states punishments upon conviction. Any action prior to the convic-
tion would be premature. The Immigration Department clarified that the 
legal provision allowing the freezing of assets and bank accounts is 
found under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, and 
Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLA), which is to be read 




together with Section 56 (1) of the Immigration Act. Under the AMLA, 
the Immigration Department could freeze accounts of those involved in 
human trafficking and in hiring trafficked foreign workers, as the use of 
such money is “tantamount to money laundering” (Malay Mail Online 
2016). 
The SME Association of Malaysia, the Federation of Malaysian 
Manufacturers, the Malaysian Malay Businessmen and Industrialists 
Association, and the Malaysian Associated Indian Chambers of Com-
merce and Industry classified the policy as “a bad one” and stated it 
would “dampen the economy”, “affect the cash flow”, and make “life 
more difficult” for businessmen (Sivanandam and Tan 2016). In 2017, 
70–80 per cent of the 650,000 small and medium-sized enterprises na-
tionwide had illegal workers due to the high cost of hiring foreign work-
ers and the associated rigid procedures. Previous legalisation pro-
grammes had been costly and stringent. These industry representatives 
urged the government to create “long-term policies” instead of penalis-
ing employers (Sivanandam and Tan 2016). However, the Malaysian 
Trades Union Congress (MTUC) welcomed the new measures as pro-
tecting job opportunities for the local workforce (The Star Online 2016).  
Between 1 January and 26 December 2016, the Immigration De-
partment recorded a total of 1174 employers involved in hiring, harbour-
ing and helping irregular migrant workers evade arrest. The department 
urged the courts to impose the maximum sentence, which included fines 
and whipping, as these bosses had rarely been whipped. The news media 
depicted the unwavering action as “The Immigration Department is 
walking the talk” (Kong 2016a). By April 2017, the department froze 
employers’ assets worth MYR 25 million, fully enforcing provisions 
under Section 56 (1) of the Immigration Act and the Anti-Money Laun-
dering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities 
Act 2001 (Rodzi 2017). As Malaysia increased its workplace enforcement, 
a more drastic plan was announced: the Immigration Department would 
name and publicly shame the errant business owners. A list of the com-
panies breaking the Immigration Act would be made public at the end of 
each month (Achariam 2016a).  
The year 2017 has witnessed harsher penalties in the form of em-
ployer sanctions, and the government proposed to increase the maxi-
mum penalty for each undocumented migrant employed. In its latest bid 
to end illegal employment, the state proposed amending the Employ-
ment (Restriction) Act of 1968 to encourage employers to hire foreign 
migrants through the proper channels and to prevent the exploitation of 
foreign workers (The Star Online 2017). Regulating the entry of foreign 
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workers was difficult when the proper channels involved a great deal of 
paperwork and cost, and many employers preferred to hire foreign la-
bourers without papers in order to have greater flexibility and fewer 
responsibilities and costs, avoiding the need to pay levies and insurance 
(Kaur 2014). The levy system, introduced in 1992, was the government’s 
attempt to gain income on migrant workers, while also trying to reduce 
the dependency on foreign workers. Considered a failed policy, the levy 
system increased the cost of illegality, and employers tried to shift the 
burden to workers (Devadason and Chan 2014: 20; Jones 2000: 82; Kaur 
2014: 351). Several revisions to levy charges, in 1995, 1998, 2005, and 
2012, coupled with the introduction of a contribution to the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) in 1998 and the minimum wage policy in 2013 
(MYR 900 in Peninsular Malaysia and MYR 800 in Sabah, Sarawak, and 
Labuan for a full-time worker), have increased the costs of legal em-
ployment, leading to the hiring of undocumented migrants (Devadason 
and Chan 2014: 28, 33).  
Under Article 18 of the existing Employment (Restriction) Act 1968, 
employing migrant workers without an employment permit is liable to a 
fine not exceeding MYR 5000 and/or imprisonment for a term not ex-
ceeding one year (Federation of Malaysia 2006b). In addition, necessary 
amendments to the Act are long overdue for limiting the entry of foreign 
workers into certain sectors and for ensuring that foreign workers are 
only allowed to work in sectors that cannot be fulfilled by local workers; 
they are not hired because of their competitively lower wages (Federa-
tion of Malaysia 2014: 72). 
The recent move could be interpreted as considering the pull factor 
when understanding irregular migration in Malaysia. Personnel interviews 
revealed that reducing the pull factor is the key to reducing the number 
of migrants. Even with high and strong walls were built at the border, 
migrants will find means to enter Malaysia if the pull factors are strong 
enough (Interview, Border Security and Police Division, 18 March 2015). 
Therefore, robust conventional enforcement is required, as there must 
be a perception that laws are enforced. Even if the immigration law is 
strict, a lack of enforcement reduces the deterrence effect. Workplace 
enforcement suffers without raids being conducted on individual em-
ployers (Krikorian 2005: 3).  
  




Workplace Raids and Ops Mega 
Workplace immigration enforcement was implemented via Ops Mega. 
After giving employers from 15 February to 30 June to participate in the 
E-Card programme, the Immigration Department pushed for the maxi-
mum punishment – fines, whipping, jail – on the “perpetrators” behind 
the illegality. Mustafar Ali reiterated that “This time we will go all out to 
push for these stubborn employers to be punished” (Malaysia Kini 2017). 
Beginning 1 July 2017, the Immigration Department launched “Ops 
Mega” (Special Operations) to weed out irregular migrants and to punish 
errant employers. Employers and immigrants who failed to apply for the 
temporary Enforcement Card (E-Card) before the deadline expired on 
30 June were tracked down under the nationwide daily operations. Only 
161,056 out of 600,000 targeted irregular immigrants registered for the 
E-Card programme, and a total of 145,571 E-Cards were issued for 
28,375 employers (The Sun Daily 2017d).  
Based on the above statistics, the government failed to achieve its 
target of getting 600,000 migrants registered under the legalisation pro-
gramme; this shows that there were still many employers hiring undocu-
mented migrants and refusing to legalise them (Lee 2017). From 1 July to 
24 July, 1,066 premises were inspected, 14,585 workers were inspected 
and 4,576 workers were detained. Due to the Ops Mega raids, undocu-
mented Indonesian workers fled into the jungle. Employers who failed 
to register such workers were brought to court and charged (Federation 
of Malaysia 2017b: 10). Through 22 September 2017, the Immigration 
Department had detained 302 employers, 100 of whom were brought to 
court for legal action, including freezing their assets and bank accounts. 
During the same period, 14,000 undocumented foreign workers were 
detained for failing to register for Enforcement Cards (or E-Cards) (Lee 
2017).  
Some critics called the E-Card programme a “tricky” option. As 
part of the surveillance exercise, the E-Card programme obtained bio-
metric data about irregular workers and allowed employers to evade legal 
action. This is not tantamount to the full legalisation of foreign workers. 
E-Card holders can be hired for just one year, during which time they 
must obtain a working permit (Kong 2017a). Enforcement operations 
were hindered due to 60 per cent of the country’s irregulars being with-
out fixed-term employment. This made E-Card registration a challenge, 
as workers were required to have a permanent employer in order to 
participate in the programme. This phenomenon, coupled with self-
employment among the irregulars and the misuse of student visas, fur-
ther complicated the problem (Kong 2017b).  
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Employers and migrants detested the E-Card programme – imple-
mented in West Malaysia only – due to the use of agents and the costs 
involved. Registered employers had to obtain documents from the em-
bassy to enable the workers to be legalised through the programme. The 
E-Card programme allowed undocumented foreign workers to tempo-
rarily work in the country until they secure a valid travel document and a 
work permit from their embassy. The E-Card application had to go 
through the existing “Rehiring Programme” via the three specified ven-
dors (Federation of Malaysia 2017a: 38–39). Furthermore, the govern-
ment imposed strict requirements on migrants and employers. Migrants 
should have an employer, be free from any criminal record, pass health 
checks, have never been deported, and not included on the suspect list 
(Federation of Malaysia 2017b: 10). This points to the programme’s 
limitation because it only targeted those people with valid documentation 
who overstayed; migrants who had entered the state without documenta-
tion left the authorities helpless.  
All workplace raids were conducted under the National Blue Ocean 
Strategy (NBOS) with joint enforcement efforts by the Immigration 
Department, the police, the People’s Volunteer Corps (RELA), the Civil 
Defence Force, and the Malaysian Armed Forces (Ministry of Defence 
2013). The Immigration Department conducted raids around the clock; 
however, law enforcement officials were unable to access certain geo-
graphical locations. The construction and plantation sectors in the forest 
involved many foreign workers, making it almost impossible for the 
officers going into the forest to find the workers. Therefore, the employ-
ers were held responsible for registering them (Federation of Malaysia 
2017b: 9–10). Furthermore, enforcement measures have been hindered 
due to foreign workers who have families in Malaysia, making it easier 
for them to find shelter (Federation of Malaysia 2017a: 41). 
Workplace raids are not something new in Malaysia’s migration 
control regime. On 1 September 2013, to implement the previously un-
enforced law, the government launched a nationwide crackdown called 
Ops 6P Bersepadu (6P Integrated Operations), expected to charge 
45,000 errant employers and to arrest 400,000 undocumented migrants. 
The high-profile operations involved 135,000 enforcement officers from 
various agencies, including the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. 
The operations were conducted at squatter houses, plantations, enter-
tainment outlets, and massage parlours across the country. The intention 
was to continue the 6P Integrated Operation until Malaysia was free of 
irregular migrants and all the country’s foreign workers had a valid doc-
ument (Rahim et al. 2013). During the first phase of Ops 6P Bersepadu 




(conducted until December 2013), 2,278 raids were carried out across the 
country, 16,800 undocumented workers were arrested and 219 employ-
ers were detained. The figures were miniscule in comparison to the actu-
al number targeted. The second phase began on 21 January 2014 with 
immigration officers conducted raids on workplaces especially factories, 
companies, and plantations. Houses were also raided in search of domes-
tic maids without permit (Ramendran 2014).  
In line with the concept of “attrition through enforcement,” em-
ployer sanctions in Malaysia are implemented along with self-deportation 
under amnesty offers. The benefit of the concept of self-deportation is 
that it addresses the size of the existing illegal population, thus reducing 
the demand on the federal government’s enforcement resources. Self-
deportation “encourages voluntary compliance with immigration laws” 
(Vaughan 2006: 2). An attrition strategy through enforcement is more 
practical, faster, cheaper and less radical than forced deportation 
(Vaughan 2006: 14). With Ops Mega conducted almost every day, the 
detention depots were packed with arrested migrants. While speeding up 
the investigation and prosecution process could avoid depot overcrowd-
ing, encouraging self-deportation is crucial to the viability of the work-
place raids. Undocumented workers who failed to register for the E-Card 
were urged to surrender under the three-plus-one amnesty programme. 
Surrendered migrants must pay a MYR 300 fine plus MYR 100 for a 
one-way return ticket to their respective countries, after which they are 
banned from entering Malaysia for five years (The Sun Daily 2017e). The 
amnesty offers are lenient, for the migrants would otherwise be liable for 
a MYR 10,000 penalty and/or a five-year imprisonment, as well as six 
strokes of whipping, should the case be brought to court and the migrant 
convicted under Section 6 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 [Amendment] 
2002 (Federation of Malaysia 2006a).  
The maximum capacity of all the 13 Immigration Depots in Malay-
sia is 50,000 immigrants, who cost MYR 1.8 million daily for food alone. 
Funds are no longer allocated for the deportees’ transportation costs. 
Since 2014, workers have had to pay for their own return trips home, 
and if they could not afford the expense, the government sought their 
families, friends, employers, or home governments to pay the deporta-
tion costs (Shah 2016a). In the first half of 2017, more than 30,000 un-
documented immigrants were deported to their home countries through 
forced removal, as well as the three-plus-one programme (Malaysia Kini 
2017). 
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The Impact of Employer Sanctions  
Malaysia’s new policy and enforcement environments had immediate 
effects on the behaviour of employers and undocumented immigrants. 
The country’s local newspapers reported that attrition through enforce-
ment had led to the increase of legal migrant workers but had unintend-
ed spill-over effects on documented migrants. The attrition generated a 
steady stream of complaints from industrial players and the immigrants’ 
countries of origin.  
As in the previous massive deportation operations, Ops Mega 
caused the economic disruption of the construction, manufacturing, and 
agricultural sectors. The consequences included operational stoppages, 
construction project delays, manpower shortages, declining production, 
and price hikes. Due to the raids, many employers halted their operations 
and kept their undocumented workers away from their dormitories 
(Kong 2017c). In the short run, the crackdown delivered a shockwave to 
the construction and service sectors. In 2017, there were more than 3 
million foreign workers in the country, half of whom lacked documenta-
tion. The labour shortage led to a higher wage demand among docu-
mented foreign workers. This spill-over not only occurred in the tradi-
tional sectors (construction and plantation), which are filled with foreign 
workers, but also affected the retail and restaurant sectors, which are not 
supposed to employ foreign workers under the immigration law. As 
these sectors hired foreigners, mainly from Bangladesh, Myanmar, and 
Indonesia, the Immigration Department’s crackdown paralysed the na-
tion’s economy (Goh 2017).  
The crackdown affected not only irregular workers but also docu-
mented foreign workers, as both were “unwilling to work due to fear” 
(Asia News Network 2017). The immigration authorities’ constant efforts 
resulted in some documented workers being detained for investigation 
and being unable to work for several days. The consequence was mostly 
felt by the construction sector, which risked affecting the timely delivery 
of goods and increasing production costs. The Federation of Manufac-
turers Malaysia (FMM) expected a disruption in the manufacturing sector 
would have a “chain reaction.” Many restaurant owners either downsized 
their businesses or reduced their operating days due to the labour short-
ages (Asia News Network 2017). 
Because of the labour shortages, documented migrant workers were 
“now worth more based on the law of supply and demand” (Kong 
2017d). Legal migrant workers requested higher pay. In some construc-
tion projects, wages skyrocketed by more than 100 per cent. For example, 
in the construction sectors in Johore state, the significant labour demand 




resulted in daily wages increasing from MYR 45 to MYR 100 (an increase 
of 122 per cent) for unskilled workers and from MYR 120 to MYR 320 
(an increase of 166 per cent) for skilled workers. Meanwhile, other sec-
tors witnessed a rise from MYR 50 to MYR 70 per day for unskilled 
workers and from MYR 120 to MYR 140 for skilled workers. Due to 
price hikes in the market, some employed legal workers left their posi-
tions to work for the highest-paying employers. This was a positive sign 
in some workforces, such as carpentry, as it attracted the local workforce 
into the industry due to the hike in wages (Kong 2017d). Employer sanc-
tions may create positive effects on the employment of legal foreign 
workers. Since the launching of Ops Mega in early July 2017, it has been 
more difficult for undocumented migrants to obtain work. Recruitment 
agencies in Malaysia resorted to hiring legal workers from source coun-
tries, including Nepal. The approval for legal foreign workers from Ne-
pal rose from 1,388 (21 to 27 June) to 1,989 (28 June to 4 July) and to 
3,264 (5 to 11 July), although these numbers are tiny compared to the 
number of Nepalis without papers (Acharya 2017).  
Section 60M of the Employment Act of 1955 (Amendment) 2012 
prohibits terminating a local employee with the purpose of employing a 
foreign worker. Meanwhile Section 60N states that when an employer is 
required to reduce his or her workforce due to redundancy, the employer 
shall not terminate the employment of a local employee unless all foreign 
employees in the same occupational category have been terminated 
(Federation of Malaysia 2012). Securing the local citizens’ rights to jobs 
could reduce the number of undocumented foreign workers. Convincing 
the employers to reduce their reliance on foreign workers is encouraged 
(Federation of Malaysia 2016c: 16). The government imposed stringent 
requirements on employers wishing to hire foreign workers; however, 
these measures did not work when the employers preferred foreign 
workers with cheaper wages. The measures included requiring employers 
to advertise job vacancies in the JobsMalaysia portal before issuing a 
JobsMalaysia certificate to employers as a prerequisite for hiring foreign 
workers. There is a designated ratio of local workers and foreign workers 
for each sector and subsector (Federation of Malaysia 2017c: 19–20).  
Sanctions on errant employers protect the rights of legal employers 
by preventing their legal workers from violating their contracts and es-
caping to another employer. Sanctions are a means of encouraging irreg-
ular migrants to take up the government’s amnesty offers; many continue 
to be in the state illegally as long as their employers continue sheltering 
them. Removing these workers from underground employment requires 
vigorous law enforcement that targets employers (Ali Mohamed 2017). 
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The previous penalty imposed in terms of compounds was relatively 
weak and did not encourage employers to hire foreign workers through 
the legal channel. Asking employers to respect the law is futile when 
employers who comply with the law must pay more than MYR 4,000 to 
get a legal foreign worker. However, those employing undocumented 
workers could afford to pay a higher salary with a lower operating cost 
because they do not spend the legal recruitment fees. The government 
policy has victimised law-abiding employers, while errant employers are 
forgiven or rewarded under amnesty programmes. A legislative member 
questioned the practice:  
How can the government ensure the interests of the legal employ-
ers when their workers flee to higher-paying jobs? How can the 
government act effectively so that law-abiders are rewarded and 
will not be the victims of those hiring undocumented workers? 
Every time, those who do not follow the law, they get amnesty, 
are forgiven. That is the problem. It is important to ensure that 
the law-abider is rewarded rather than those who do not follow 
the law are rewarded. (Ngeh Koo Ham, in Federation of Malaysia 
2017a: 39–40) 
Unlike past practices, in which the state yielded to employer and indus-
trial pressure, workplace enforcement under Ops Mega witnessed an 
indifferent attitude toward employers’ complaints. Law enforcers were 
accused of causing “trouble” whenever raids were carried out. Employ-
ers who were short of foreign workers criticised law enforcement, imply-
ing that these employers have been employing undocumented workers. 
The Immigration Department viewed this situation as “deeply regretta-
ble,” as irregular migration will never be solved as long as the irresponsi-
ble employers continue to hire undocumented workers. Employers cited 
the high cost of the legalisation programme as the main difficulty en-
countered, though the compound imposed in the legalisation programme 
was lower than the cost of legal recruitment (Kong 2017e).  
At the same time, the state’s unbending attitude, regardless of pres-
sures from neighbouring countries, was in sharp contrast to its willing-
ness to compromise in the past with Indonesia and the Philippines over 
the question of detention and deportation. In 2002, for example, Malay-
sia complied with these countries’ requests to temporarily halt deporta-
tion when there was overcrowding and a humanitarian crisis at the transit 
centre (Nesadurai 2013: 101–102; Kaur 2014: 358). Under the current 
Ops Mega, foreign governments were asked to respect Malaysia’s efforts 
in detaining and deporting irregulars (The Sun Daily 2017c). Indonesia, 
Nepal, and Bangladesh are among the most affected countries due to 




Malaysia’s crackdown. Indonesia raised a critical voice, requesting Malay-
sia to stop its operation and to resume its E-Card legalisation programme. 
The Indonesian Manpower Minister, Hanif Dhakiri, urged Malaysia to 
extend the E-Card programme since the raids forced many Indonesians 
to flee. Despite pressure from Indonesia, Malaysia decided not to extend 
the E-Card programme (Mohsen 2017). Nepal was the first country to 
react and cooperated with Malaysia to ensure the return of its detained 
nationals. The Nepal Embassy covered the cost for any Nepalis who 
were unable to buy return tickets. Around 500,000 Nepalis were working 
in Malaysia, including 40,000 without documentation, which affected the 
remittance flow to Nepal (The Sun Daily 2017b). Given the high number 
of Bangladeshi working in Malaysia, Bangladesh’s government was urged 
to better protect its arrested citizens and to negotiate with Malaysia (The 
Sun Daily 2017a).  
Malaysia’s attrition landscape not only witnesses the systematic en-
forcement of the Immigration Act on employers and workers but also 
addresses a serious failing in the law enforcement: corruption and the 
lack of responsibility among employers. The scope of corruption within 
the agencies responsible for immigration was documented extensively in 
the media. One news report indicated that a group of immigration offic-
ers accepted bribes of MYR 200–2,500 from more than 16,000 migrants, 
totalling approximately MYR 18 million in bribes. In tandem with the 
punishment against employers, errant officers were also targeted. In 2016, 
the Immigration Department’s director-general pledged to take a hard 
line on errant officers and on those offering bribes. In an effort to clean 
up the department internally, immigration officers taking bribes would 
face the full brunt of the law (Achariam 2016b).  
Thus, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) partici-
pated in all enforcement operations in line with the National Blue Ocean 
Strategy (NBOS). While the external operational forces are strengthened 
under the NBOS, the internal enforcement must be strengthened first. 
Integrity has been the biggest problem facing all of the enforcement 
agencies. To enhance integrity in the Immigration Department, an Integ-
rity Division was established and led by the MACC senior assistant 
commissioner. The Integrity Division placed integrity officers in all state 
immigration offices (Federation of Malaysia 2015). The Immigration 
Department pledged to be corruption-free, in line with the MACC and 
its “zero tolerance toward graft” policy (Majib 2017). 
The government also tried to ensure greater responsibility among 
employers toward their foreign workers. The Immigration Department 
has been efficient in arresting immigrants – a total of 146,876 migrants 
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were arrested under 26,870 enforcement operations between 2014 and 
2016 – but no one has been made responsible for the workers after their 
employment ends (Majib 2017). Personal interviews confirmed the cur-
rent state of affairs: 
It is not wise to focus only on arrests. It will become a continuous 
routine. If you try to wipe away dust every day, there will still be 
dust accumulating the next day. Why not make investments in or-
der to ensure the “dust” does not accumulate more and more eve-
ry day by taking wiser actions? (Interview, Border Security and Po-
lice Division, 18 March 2015) 
A noticeable loophole in the system is that there is no mechanism that 
triggers when a given permit has expired. Does the government have 
enforcers or anyone who will find these overstayers once their permits 
have expired? If this is the second time an immigrant has committed the 
offence, are the laws and their associated punishments sufficient? When 
asked about preventive measures, the officer stated, “It is not about total 
prevention but just finding the loopholes. We are not being creative in 
thinking of ways to curb this problem” (Interview, Border Security and 
Police Division, 18 March 2015). The Immigration Department realised 
the importance of making the employers responsible for monitoring 
their workers until they are sent back home and of shifting the surveil-
lance duty to the employers. The next section examines two newly intro-
duced principles into Malaysia’s workplace surveillance. 
Workplace Surveillance: Strict Liability Principle 
and Employers’ Mandatory Commitment 
One of the most important frameworks to have been debated (with 
limited success) is the Strict Liability Principle on employers hiring for-
eign workers. This principle ensures that employers are responsible and 
accountable for their foreign workers, from the application, hiring, and 
employment until they return to their home countries. Employers have 
to provide accommodations as a prerequisite for having foreign worker 
applications approved. This ensures that foreign workers are housed near 
their place of work, reducing the risk of social and criminal problems. 
The Cabinet Committee for Foreign Workers and Illegal Immigrants 
(JKKPA-PATI) created this principle in its 14th meeting in 2015. As of 
30 June 2015, the number of foreign workers with a working permit in 
Malaysia was 2.2 million (Cabinet Committee for Foreign Workers and 
Illegal Immigrants 2015).  




Parallel with efforts to combat illegal employment, the state also 
moved to solve illegal settlement, excluding migrants from the housing 
market. In 2016, the state decided to introduce a strict liability pro-
gramme, a package that included accommodations, insurance, and medi-
cal benefits for foreign workers. This programme was meant to monitor 
the foreign workers’ movement while enhancing security and improving 
public health. The idea is to make employers accountable even if one 
worker is missing (Chuah 2016). The programme was necessary because 
some employers had neglected the welfare of their foreign workers. 
Without housing facilities, foreign workers are renting houses illegally, 
creating uneasiness among locals living in the same neighbourhood (Mu-
sa 2016). As part of the Strict Liability Principle, the foreign worker ac-
commodation programme (MyHom) was launched in 2016 to cater to 
the 1.5 million foreign workers in industrial areas nationwide. Either the 
companies rent housing for their workers or the workers themselves can 
rent directly from the assigned vendor, MyEG. When the Standard Min-
imum Housing and Amenities Act 446 (1990) was amended, it became 
mandatory for employers to provide minimum standard housing for 
foreign workers by 2018. By July 2017, the first phase was completed in 
the state of Malacca, which was occupied by 1,400 foreign workers 
(Yeong 2017).  
Another new principle introduced is the Employers’ Mandatory 
Commitment (EMC), which has been subject to extensive political and 
economic debates. On 31 December 2016, Home Minister Ahmad Za-
hid Hamidi announced the EMC implementation with the objective of 
ensuring employers’ accountability for their foreign workers during their 
term of employment, from their appointment to a safe passage home. 
The new policy would prevent cases caused by overstaying, running away 
from employers, and changing work sectors illegally. Effective 1 January 
2017, employers would be responsible for paying their foreign workers’ 
levy, instead of deducting it from their wages. In addition, employers are 
responsible for foreign workers’ accommodations and must follow the 
“Guidelines on the Minimum Standard of Foreign Workers Accommo-
dation.” This policy is meant to protect against malpractice, unscrupu-
lous employers, and human trafficking (Malaysia Kini 2016).  
Employers protested the last-minute announcement, pushing for 
the levy to be scrapped. A total of 159 associations rallied for the deci-
sion to be withdrawn, claiming that it would cost industries an additional 
MYR 5 billion a year and reduce businesses’ competitiveness. Under the 
current system, the levy ranges from MYR 1,500 to MYR 2,500, depend-
ing on the industry. The employers believed that the EMC levy would 
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increase the hiring cost of legal workers, which would further fuel the 
demand for irregular foreign workers. Furthermore, the official an-
nouncement was made just one day before it was set to be implemented, 
without consulting the employers (Chan 2017). If the employers were 
forced to bear the levy, the economy would suffer an estimated annual 
loss of MYR 5 billion; foreign workers may remit this amount to their 
countries of origin. When the minimum wage policy for foreign workers 
was implemented, an annual loss of MYR 3 billion was estimated (Kan-
nan 2017).  
Due to market pressure, the EMC policy did not launch as planned. 
In January 2017, the Malaysian Cabinet decided to postpone the imple-
mentation of the employers’ mandatory levy payment to 2018, when 
there is a conducive ecosystem to support its implementation (Abas 
2017). Furthermore, the policy was drawn up without engaging the in-
dustry stakeholders and without giving them sufficient time to adjust to 
the new ruling, and it was challenging for employers to absorb the new 
costs. This was considered a desperate act to achieve the goal of zero 
irregular migrants without considering the possible consequences. The 
news media called the EMC “medicine that employers have to swallow 
to avoid getting sicker” (Cheng 2017). According to a survey conducted 
by the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM), 72 per cent of the 
370 companies voted against the EMC, 45 per cent of respondents said 
the levy was paid by their foreign workers, 17 per cent paid for their 
foreign workers, and 17 per cent shared the cost. The majority (74 per 
cent) believed that the EMC would increase the cost of doing business. 
Some opined that the government should address the issue of undocu-
mented migrants, rather than legal foreign workers (Free Malaysia Today 
2017).  
The mistreatment and abuse of undocumented migrants is prevalent; 
the media has reported extensively on cases of poor working conditions, 
excessive working hours, low wages, and forced labour. The issue is two-
pronged: while the government wants to remove undocumented workers 
from the underground economy, it must still protect migrant workers’ 
rights. Research shows limited discourse regarding migrant rights in 
Malaysia and the lack of commitment to the UN standards, such as the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of All Migrants and their 
Families (Elias 2010; Gurowitz 2000). Malaysia has yet to ratify the 1990 
UN Convention, which aims to accord equal treatment between docu-
mented foreign workers and locals. The EMC signals the state’s com-
mitment toward this direction, and a greater commitment to migrant 




rights would improve Malaysia’s scores regionally.3 On 1 February 2017, 
under the EMC programme, the Home Affairs Ministry called all Malay-
sian employers through their associations and reminded them that they 
must sign a pledge (Aku Janji in Malay) as proof that they were comply-
ing with national laws (Federation of Malaysia 2017b: 40). 
Applying the Strict Liability Principle and the EMC, this paper fur-
ther suggests that employers should be required to register all their em-
ployees. The mechanism for compulsory verification, monitoring, and 
surveillance already exists. In February 2017, two employers’ databases 
were established: the SPPA (Foreign Worker Application System) and 
the ePPAx (Integrated Management System of Foreign Workers). The 
SPPA is an online application process for newly hired Bangladeshi mi-
grant workers, created following the Government-to-Government 
Agreement between Bangladesh and Malaysia. The Bangladesh Govern-
ment requested that Malaysia implement the SPPA system to safeguard 
its workers’ interests. The registration system for non-Bangladeshi mi-
grant workers is ePPAx (Federation of Malaysia 2017a: 42–43). The 
construction of national employer databases solved the problem of for-
eign worker registration faced by employers. Prior to these databases, 
obtaining a working permit could only be completed at the Home Af-
fairs Ministry’s headquarters in Putrajaya. Employers complained about 
having to queue at 3 a.m. in Putrajaya since there is a daily quota for the 
process and only one processing centre in Malaysia (Federation of Ma-
laysia 2017a: 41).  
Surveillance and identification are integrated with the employer da-
tabases. In a bid to prevent illegal employment in the construction sec-
tors, it was made compulsory for contractors to submit their foreign 
workers’ thumbprints to the Immigration Department. The biometric 
surveillance database would make it difficult to hire undocumented mi-
grants unknowingly. By 2009, CLAB (Construction Labour Exchange 
Centre Berhad) submitted 12,000 foreign workers’ thumbprints into the 
database. Since June 2006, it has been compulsory for contractors need-
ing 50 or fewer foreign construction workers to register and deal directly 
with CLAB (The Star Online 2009). The development of this control in-
strument is significant because it delegates workplace surveillance to 
non-state actors. Employers can be given the authority to check the 
validity of work permits and to renew work permits if employees per-
formed satisfactorily. This practice has strong disciplinary effects on the 
                                                 
3  The author is grateful to a reviewer for this suggestion. 
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migrants, as they will be well-behaved and will be less likely to run away 
(Frank 2014: 416).  
Analysis and Discussion 
There are four possible areas for improvement in making attrition 
through enforcement a reality in Malaysia. First, sanctions should be 
extended to airlines, shipping companies, health professionals, educa-
tional institutions, banks, landlords and the public. Widening the en-
forcement net would make private individuals and institutions act like 
“immigration enforcers” (Bloch, Kumarappan, and Mckay 2015: 133–
135). Excluding the migrants from the housing market and informal 
networks is as important as exclusion from the labour market. As irregu-
lar migrants are highly dependent on their social networks in their daily 
lives, it is only rational that a strategy of exclusion would work through 
the “delegitimization and criminalization of all those employing, housing, 
and aiding irregular migrants” (Broeders and Engberson 2007: 1596). 
Under the enforcement of employer sanctions, individual homeowners 
have been left out, even though they contributed to the unauthorised 
immigrant employment in domestic care jobs (Cornelius 2005: 786). The 
central weakness of any immigration sanction is the failure to adequately 
address the harbouring of irregulars and a lack of integrity. Thus, sanc-
tions should not only target the migrants but rather “those who profit 
from illegal movements” (Castles 2004: 875).  
Tightening the enforcement net to include sanctions of social net-
works would contribute to a successful deterrence model. Personal in-
terviews revealed that the harbouring of irregular migrants among the 
public has reached a crisis point when Malaysian citizens are breaking the 
immigration law for material gain, facilitating the entry, employment, and 
prolonged stay of migrants. Disrupting the positive environment in Ma-
laysia is a crucial part of addressing the “problematic mentality in society.” 
The awareness level in Malaysia is zero , with the public turning a blind 
eye and a deaf ear to the activities of irregulars. Citizens are hiring maids 
without a working permit and renting their accommodations, knowing 
that these practices are illegal. The mentality of cheating the system for 
monetary gain cannot be changed:  
We are sometimes deadlocked to solve this problem. We have no 
idea how to educate society. The system of enforcement can be 
enhanced, the assets also can be increased, and manpower can be 
added. But determining how to educate our people is too difficult. 
The awareness and the responsibility is like zero. This raises the 




question whether information and awareness campaigns are ap-
propriate to be implemented. (Interview, Principal Assistant Sec-
retary, Immigration Affairs Division, 10 August 2015) 
The second policy implication in making attrition through enforcement a 
reality is that legalisation, regularisation, and amnesty programmes 
should be prohibited, as they encourage more illegal immigration and are 
“subversive of law enforcement” (Krikorian 2005: 6). An effective strat-
egy for immigration law enforcement requires the “consistent application 
of ordinary law-enforcement tools” (Krikorian 2005: 6). In Malaysia, the 
prohibition of amnesty or legalisation programmes for undocumented 
migrants is noticeable. There have not been many amnesties in recent 
years, as the government halted legalisation efforts through the “Rehiring” 
programme (Federation of Malaysia 2016a: 154). The recent semi-legali-
sation “Rehiring” and “E-Card” programmes have been stricter. Com-
pared to all the previous legalisation programmes, such as the 6P pro-
gramme, it is costlier and burdensome for employers to legalise their 
foreign workers. Many employers preferred the 6P legalisation pro-
gramme, implemented between 2011 and 2014, which was free of regis-
tration costs and could be done without any agents. The conditions im-
posed under the Rehiring Programme were stricter and included a pro-
cessing fee of MYR 1200 through appointed vendors that was regarded 
as unreasonable (Ragananthini 2017). This unpromising situation could 
be interpreted as signalling the end of leniency toward errant employers. 
Eliminating the promise of amnesty will function as a deterrent and 
further discourage underground employment.  
Third, several existing online systems have been developed to moni-
tor the recruitment and surveillance of foreign workers: the SPPA,  
ePPAx, and CLAB. These employer database systems provide a solid 
foundation for the compulsory registration of foreign workers by every 
employer, and the failure to do so rests on the employer. Going forward, 
the system should also require all employers to verify the status of em-
ployees through the federal government, as is the case in the United 
States, and failure to do so could cause the suspension of one’s business 
license (Kobach 2008: 162); however, that may not be a severe penalty, 
for they can just register a new business.4 With the use of the E-verify 
biometric system (in the US), securitisation takes place within national 
borders; the workplace has been transformed into a site of immigration 
enforcement. This would shift the responsibility of enforcement to pri-
vate sector employers, who will act as immigration police. The logic 
                                                 
4  This point was noted by a reviewer. 
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behind the E-verification of migrant workers is to create a biometric 
database, which is an instrument for the digitalisation of the border. 
Workplace surveillance is considered “soft” immigration enforcement 
for building an interiorised border, while external border control works 
as the “hard” enforcement policy tool (Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano 
2017: 1).  
Fourth, while employer sanctions are “pragmatic,” one should also 
consider “preventive” migration control, which addresses the root causes 
of migration. The preventive approach is a soft approach to influence 
potential migrants’ decision making, emphasising incentives and deci-
sion-making aspects (Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011: 50). En-
couraging safe migration is an area where policy can make a difference. 
Increasing legal entry opportunities for low-skilled foreign workers and 
providing adequate employment visas will have a higher probability of 
success (Cornelius and Salehyan 2007: 150). The absence of regular em-
ployment options, despite the need for labourers, does not reflect the 
market realities. If labour market realities are not reflected in the immi-
gration system, many workers in low-skilled jobs will enter the country 
illegally (Cornelius 2005: 789). Frustrating the black-market employment 
opportunities serves as a deterrent, while enhancing the mechanism for 
legal employment channels serves as an incentive (Vaughan 2006: 14).  
Thus far, Malaysia’s geography of migration control has focused on 
its national territory and has underestimated the real push factors that 
often compel migrants to seek living outside their homeland. For irregu-
lar migrants who are destitute in their home country, the threat of deter-
rence does not work. There are also structural conditions that might not 
allow return, such as wars and conflicts (Rocha et al. 2014: 95). This 
raises the question of whether a more active mode of migration man-
agement cooperation with third countries could be achieved on issues 
like bilateral cooperation, readmission agreements, creating legal chan-
nels for migrants, and establishing external processing centres in transit 
countries. This would require the state to explore the extra-territoriali-
sation of migration control (Funk et al. 2017: 1–2). 
Conclusion 
A strategy of attrition through enforcement is significant because it con-
sistently enforces the Immigration Act’s employer sanctions, thus tilting 
the deterrence model toward employers. The Malaysian state is leaving 
no stone unturned in trying to create a greater deterrence outcome. As 
the employer-focused approach is relatively new, with measures imple-




mented since only 2016, it may be too early to state its effectiveness with 
any confidence. However, I argue that the benefits of employer-centred 
sanctions seem to outweigh the higher transactional costs, the impact on 
the economy, and the question of the legal consequences infringing per-
sonal rights (punishment by canning and asset-freezing).5 A strategy of 
attrition through enforcement not only disrupts the positive environ-
ment sustaining irregular migration, but also ensures the improved pro-
tection of the migrants’ welfare. Sanctions have positive impacts on 
employment rights. The introduction of a Strict Liability Programme 
makes employers accountable for the accommodations, insurance, and 
medical benefits of their foreign workers. Although controversial, the 
Employers’ Mandatory Commitment programme addresses an existing 
inadequacy in the labour recruitment system by making employers ac-
countable for their foreign workers until they are returned home. Anoth-
er important potential of the new sanction regime is that it goes together 
with integrating biometric surveillance into the employers’ databases: the 
SPPA, ePPAx, and CLAB. The next stage in the attrition strategy is to 
introduce the employers’ compulsory verification of all foreign workers’ 
legal statuses. In applying employer sanctions, Malaysia has adhered to a 
two-pronged policy: reducing undocumented migrants by increasing the 
legal consequences and supporting the recruitment of legal workers by 
promoting workers’ welfare.  
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